Feb 8: Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service, International Security and Estonia 2023
As published online on February 8, 2023
Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service, International Security and Estonia 2023
Dear reader,
You are holding the eighth edition of the Foreign Intelligence Service’s annual report, the first I have the honour to present as Director General. At a time when Europe is witnessing its biggest war since 1945, the thirst for intelligence services’ situation reports and analyses has grown. We seek to fulfil our role to the best of our ability.
In last year’s report, we wrote that Russia would create the conditions and capabilities necessary to launch a large-scale military offensive against Ukraine in the second half of February 2022. Unfortunately, that is what happened.
Russia has so far failed in its war of aggression. It attacked Ukraine with a plan for a quick coup based on absurd assumptions and a manipulated intelligence picture. In the first months of the war, the Ukrainians destroyed a significant part of the best units of the Russian army, which, as the war drags on, has led to Russia’s critical need for mobilised troops, private military companies and arms from pariah states. The war strangles the Russian economy and raises the temperature in otherwise apolitical Russian society. The Russian elite is increasingly discussing whether “the First Person has gone mad”, but most of them lack the courage to take real steps towards change. Russia’s stubbornly imperialist stance towards its neighbours persists, and Russians’ fear of mobilisation surpasses their sense of responsibility for the genocide committed by their compatriots.
Despite setbacks and risks, Vladimir Putin’s goal in Ukraine has not changed by early 2023. For now, there is still enough fuel to keep the war machine going – Russia will not run out of cannon fodder, Soviet-era armaments or propaganda-induced imperialism any time soon. However, a quality leap in Russia’s war-fighting capability is very unlikely. Putin is playing for time, believing that Ukraine and the West will wear out before Russia. Putin thinks he can “bomb” Ukraine to the negotiating table.
Internally, Russia has become Soviet Union 2.0, drawing inspiration from Stalinist repression, Khrushchevian sloganeering and Brezhnevian stagnation. Paradoxically, in Russia today, Putin’s regime is simultaneously the strongest and the weakest it has ever been. But there seems to be no new Gorbachev, not to mention Yeltsin, on the horizon. The democratic world should not harbour illusions that post-Putin Russia will embrace democratic values any time soon.
This year’s report also discusses the course change in Russian foreign policy. Russian diplomats, led by Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, were caught off guard by the war in Ukraine. Realising that it lacks influence on strategic issues has led the Russian foreign ministry’s morale to decline. Russia has given up on the West for the foreseeable future and is seeking new friends, mainly in Africa and Asia.
Once again, we will also look at China. Under the leadership of Xi Jinping, who started his third term and secured absolute power, China is moving towards deepening authoritarianism and confrontation with the West. Russia plays an important role in China’s global ambitions, and the two countries agree on many points. Therefore, it would be a mistake to take Xi’s restrained support for Putin’s war in Ukraine as a sign that China is distancing itself from Russia.
The Foreign Intelligence Service celebrated its 30th anniversary a few months ago. With our domestic and international partners, we continue to work to ensure that the Estonian leadership and our allies have the best information on the security situation and sufficient advance warning. And to ensure that Ukraine wins.
Bravely onward and Sláva Ukrayíni!
Kaupo Rosin
Director General, Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service
31.01.2023
Table of Contents
1. CHAPTER: RUSSIAN ARMED FORCES AND THE WAR IN UKRAINE 9
Russia’s War Against Ukraine 10
Russian Armed Forces Near The Estonian Border 12
Russia Continues To Look For A Weak Link In Ukrainian Cyberspace 14
Belarus As A Foothold In The Ukrainian Conflict 18
Russian Administration In The Occupied Territories Of Ukraine 21
2. CHAPTER: RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY 25
‘Regrouping’ Of Russian Foreign Policy 26
A Paper Tiger In The Caucasus 30 Russia’s African Policy 32
3. CHAPTER: RUSSIAN DOMESTIC POLITICS AND ECONOMY 37
Russia’s Domestic Political Situation 38
The Russian Economy 42
4. CHAPTER: RUSSIAN SPECIAL SERVICES 47
Covers Used By Russian Intelligence Services 48
The Russian Special Services’ Support To President Putin 52
5. CHAPTER: RUSSIAN INFLUENCE 55
The Candle Of The ‘Russian World’ Is Burning Out 56
6. CHAPTER: CHINA 61 China’s Global Embrace 62
China’s Calculations On Attacking Taiwan 64
Chinese-Russian Relations In The Context Of The War In Ukraine 66
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1. The Ukrainians’ will to defend, the capabilities of their Armed Forces, and Western unity in supporting Ukraine surprised the Kremlin. Despite this, Russia’s strategic goal remains the same: subjugating Ukraine and changing the European security architecture. Read more in chapters 1.1, 2.1
2. Russia believes that time is on its side. To keep the war machine going, Russia is ready to raise the stakes. Russia seems to believe it can “bomb” Ukraine to the negotiating table. Read more in chapter 1.1
3. Russia’s belligerence has significantly increased the security risks for Estonia, and the large-scale exercise Zapad 23 may further strain the situation in the Baltic Sea region. Russia still has enough strength to exert credible military pressure in our region. Read more in chapter 1.2
4. Russia supports its military efforts in Ukraine by using cyber tools against Ukraine and the countries that support it. Its activities in cyberspace have not yielded the results Russia had hoped for, but we must remain vigilant. Read more in chapter 1.3
5. The Russian special services officers hide behind various “covers”. A tried-and-tested cover organisation used abroad is the Russian Orthodox Church, which the Kremlin also operates as an instrument of influence against Ukraine and the West. Read more in chapters 4, 5
6. Belarus has provided logistical and material support to Russia in the war against Ukraine, but the Belarusian Armed Forces have not yet intervened in the military operations in Ukraine and do not wish to do so in the future. Read more in chapter 1.4
7. Russia is moving towards a total dictatorship. The prospects for the current regime collapsing and the country democratising are slim despite the problems caused by the war and Western sanctions. On the contrary, an even more radical faction is rising to the fore in Russia’s ruling elite. Read more in chapter 3.1
8. In foreign policy, Russia has its stakes on creating a geopolitical coalition of authoritarian regimes opposed to the West who share a mistrust of Western policies and values. Diplomatic resources are being diverted from the West to other regions. Read more in chapter 2.1
9. Russia’s military credibility in former Soviet territories has weakened because Russia has failed to provide the security guarantees promised within the CSTO framework, and its Armed Forces have been unsuccessful in Ukraine. In Africa, however, Russia sees its best opportunities precisely in the field of security. Read more in chapters 2.2, 2.3
10. Under Xi Jinping, China is moving towards deepening authoritarianism and no longer hides its ambition to become a global superpower. China’s efforts to build a community of like-minded countries opposed to the West under the banner of the Global Security Initiative – which would also include Russia – undermines Estonia’s security. Read more in chapter 6.
1. RUSSIAN ARMED FORCES AND THE WAR IN UKRAINE
1.1 RUSSIA’S WAR AGAINST UKRAINE
Subjugating Ukraine and reshaping European security architecture remains Russia’s strategic objective.
Russia believes time is on its side in the war as Ukraine and its partners are less prepared to sustain a drawn-out conflict.
Russia plans to mobilise additional resources to support its military action, continuing the war into 2023.
1.2 RUSSIAN ARMED FORCES NEAR THE ESTONIAN BORDER
A military attack against Estonia is unlikely in 2023 because Russia’s military capabilities are engaged in Ukraine. However, in the mid-to-long term, Russia’s belligerence and foreign policy ambitions have significantly increased the security risks for Estonia.
Mobilisation and large-scale exercises planned by Russia could further strain the security situation in the Baltic Sea region in 2023.
From the Baltic states’ perspective, Russia still has enough military capability to exert credible military pressure in our region. The capabilities of the Russian Armed Forces in the immediate vicinity of the Estonian border can be quantitatively reconstituted in up to four years.
1.3 RUSSIA CONTINUES TO LOOK FOR A WEAK LINK IN UKRAINIAN CYBERSPACE
Russia uses cyberattacks to support its general goals in Ukraine: to break Ukrainian resistance, undermine the government’s image and disrupt the functioning of the state. Cyber espionage is likely the biggest threat stemming from cyberspace.
Russia underestimated the resilience of Ukraine’s cyberspace and the help it receives from Western countries and cybersecurity companies.
Threats posted on social media and cyberattacks continue as part of the influence operations against countries that actively support Ukraine, including Estonia.
1.4 BELARUS AS A FOOTHOLD IN THE UKRAINIAN CONFLICT
Contrary to Russia’s wishes, Belarus has not sent its army units to Ukraine.
By supporting Russia morally, materially and logistically, including by allowing the free use of its territory for manoeuvres and strikes against Ukraine by Russian forces, Belarus hopes to reduce Russian pressure to intervene militarily in the war in Ukraine.
The Belarusian Army’s direct involvement in the Ukrainian conflict would be a political gesture with no significant strategic impact on the course of the war.
1.5 RUSSIAN ADMINISTRATION IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES OF UKRAINE
Russia’s annexation of the occupied territories in October 2022 indicates that it has no intention of voluntarily returning them to Ukraine in the future and is ready for a prolonged confrontation with Ukraine and the West.
The fake referendums on joining Russia were passed off as the will of the people remaining in the occupied territories, although the results were known well in advance.
The Russian-occupied areas are undergoing severe regression – they are being Russified and stripped of local resources. The new authorities take no interest in local life and people.
2. RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY
2.1 ‘REGROUPING’ OF RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY
The demands Russia presented to NATO and the US on 17 December 2021 indicated its long-term goal of changing the fundamentals of European security. Defeating Ukraine is an essential prerequisite for this.
Putin is focusing on creating a geopolitical coalition of authoritarian regimes whose common ground is to oppose the West, democracy and the rule of law.
The invasion of Ukraine ended the Russian foreign ministry’s hopes of playing a meaningful strategic role in the country’s foreign policy planning.
2.2 A PAPER TIGER IN THE CAUCASUS
Moscow and the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) ignored appeals for help from an official ally.
The credibility of Russia’s military deterrence in former Soviet territory has weakened.
The reason is the engagement and inefficiency of the Russian Armed Forces in Ukraine
2.3 RUSSIA’S AFRICAN POLICY
Increasingly affected by the sanctions imposed by Western countries, Russia has intensified its efforts in Africa to project itself as a geopolitically active great power.
Russia hopes to achieve rapid diplomatic and economic success with the cheapest possible means; however, in reality, it lacks the capacity to fully implement its plans in Africa.
Russia sees itself as having the greatest potential as a provider of security services in Africa and focuses on politically unstable countries that provide Russia with opportunities to profit from local natural resources.
3. RUSSIAN DOMESTIC POLITICS AND ECONOMY
3.1 RUSSIA’S DOMESTIC POLITICAL SITUATION
Putin’s regime is rapidly moving towards an open dictatorship. As the country is at war, the last vestiges of democratic government have been abandoned, and any dissent qualifies as a crime.
In the coming years, the current regime led by Putin, or a slightly modified but equally undemocratic and coercive updated version, will most likely continue to hold power in Russia.
Russia’s transformation into a stable democracy is unlikely in the coming years.
3.2 THE RUSSIAN ECONOMY
Oil exports and the high price of oil in 2022 have helped Russia withstand the pressure of sanctions. However, in 2023 the sanctions imposed on Russia’s oil exports will begin to have an effect. This will lead to a decrease in Russia’s oil revenue.
The self-imposed sanctions by international businesses, such as leaving Russia, have hit the Russian economy faster than the sanctions imposed by national regulations.
Russia is exploiting the issue of food security to promote the narrative of peace at any price in Ukraine.
4. RUSSIAN SPECIAL SERVICES
4.1 COVERS USED BY RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES
Russian intelligence services widely use covers to hide the connections between intelligence operatives and their real employer – the intelligence service.
On Russian territory, intelligence services can use almost any institution, company, or organisation as cover.
Anyone communicating with Russian federal or regional authorities, research institutions, or strategic companies should remember that their international relations, especially with Western countries, are largely controlled by Russian intelligence services.
4.2 THE RUSSIAN SPECIAL SERVICES’ SUPPORT TO PRESIDENT PUTIN
During the war in Ukraine, the Russian special services have deliberated and concocted messages to help explain Russia’s actions to its citizens and show the president in a favourable light.
The messages justify Putin’s actions in Ukraine and create an image of him as an astute leader with foresight but, at the same time, lack objectivity and context and are often subject to public ridicule.
The prevailing view in the Russian special services is that by persistently lying and feeding conspiracy theories, sometimes hinting at the involvement of special services to add mystery, they can continue to speak to a certain segment of society.
5. RUSSIAN INFLUENCE
5.1 THE CANDLE OF THE ‘RUSSIAN WORLD’ IS BURNING OUT
The Kremlin uses the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) as an outpost of its struggle against Ukraine and the West.
The Russian special services are trying at all costs to preserve the structures of the ROC as a tried-and-tested cover in foreign countries.
Russian terror in Ukraine irreversibly damages the position and international influence of the ROC.
CHINA
6.1 CHINA’S GLOBAL EMBRACE
The absolute power achieved by Xi Jinping at the Communist Party Congress set the tone for China’s development over the next 100 years.
Chinese intelligence services plan to use the Global Security Initiative to disrupt the Western security architecture.
Xi Jinping’s pledge to open China up to the world means an even more vigorous implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative.
6.2 CHINA’S CALCULATIONS ON ATTACKING TAIWAN
China’s changed rhetoric suggests a desire to constrict the existential space of Taiwan: Taiwan duli versus Taidu.
It is not certain that Western sanctions will deter China, as China has strong countermeasures in place.
China is very unlikely to attack Taiwan in 2023, but the likelihood will increase with time
6.3 CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE WAR IN UKRAINE
The war started by Russia in Ukraine has not radically changed the relations between China and Russia. But some pre-war trends have strengthened, likely increasing the inequality in their relationship.
With China’s support, Russia hopes to reduce the impact of the restrictions imposed on it due to the war, which increases Russia’s economic and technological dependence on China and its preparedness to appease China on divisive issues.
Russia still plays a significant role in China’s global ambitions, so it is premature to see Xi Jinping’s restrained support for Putin’s war as a sign of distancing from Russia.
