Jul 31: Chatham House: How to end Russia's war on Ukraine
Report as published by Chatham House on June 27, 2023
Before reading…
The Chatham House report was published on June 27, and I’ve finally completed reading it and absorbing its content—it’s meaty. I’ve included a video of the Chatham House event introducing the report, and its main takeaways.
Chatham House: How to end Russia's war on Ukraine
As Ukraine continues to fight to liberate its occupied territories and eject Russian invaders, its Western backers debate the likely endgame for the war and its aftermath.
The international response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, while impressive in many ways, remains inadequate to the task and dangerously wobbly. Russia’s wider threat to the rules-based international order is also insufficiently acknowledged.
Many proposals have been put forward for how the conflict could, or should, be brought to a close. Some, though well-intentioned, involve concessions that would effectively appease Russia, betray Ukraine and endanger Europe.
Persistent calls for a ceasefire or ‘negotiated settlement’ to end the fighting without tackling its underlying cause – Russia’s ambition to eliminate Ukraine as we know it – will do no more than reward the aggressor while punishing the victim.
This multi-author report takes nine commonly espoused ideas for quick fixes or objections to bolstering assistance to Ukraine, and weighs them against both current reality and their long-term consequences.
The unanimous conclusion of the authors is that the only outcome to the war that can safeguard the future security of Europe is a convincing Ukrainian victory – hence, Western military support to Kyiv should be redoubled before it is too late.
Chapters
Fallacy 1: ‘Settle now: all wars end at the negotiating table’
Fallacy 2: ‘Ukraine should concede territory in exchange for peace’
Fallacy 5: ‘Russian defeat is more dangerous than Russian victory’
Fallacy 6: ‘Russia’s defeat in Ukraine will lead to greater instability in Russia’
Fallacy 7: ‘This is costing too much, and the West needs to restore economic ties with Russia’
Fallacy 9: ‘This war is not our fight, and there are more important global problems’
Summary
It’s now or never for Ukraine. A protracted or frozen conflict benefits Russia and hurts Ukraine, as does a ceasefire or negotiated settlement on Russia’s terms. If Ukraine is to avoid these outcomes and turn tenacious defence and incremental battlefield gains into outright victory, it needs far more ambitious international military assistance than it has received to date. This report presents the case for an immediate and decisive increase in such support, seeks to dispel overhyped concerns about provoking Russia, and counsels against accommodating Moscow’s demands.
Ukraine’s need is all the more pressing because the United States – the principal donor of financial and military aid to Kyiv – is entering an election cycle that could soon reduce US foreign policy engagement or ultimately result in a more inward-looking administration in Washington. Increasing the West’s supply of weaponry for Ukraine now would, in addition to helping ongoing military actions against Russian forces, provide a measure of insulation against any future weakening of US solidarity.
The argument for Western military and diplomatic resolve is reinforced by the impacts of Russian aggression beyond Ukraine itself. Not only is European security under threat, but the viability of the rules-based international order is potentially at stake. With this full-scale invasion, Russia has directly challenged arrangements that have helped to secure peace for over 70 years. The world will be safer with Russia defeated soundly on the battlefield than with an ambiguous outcome that, for instance, institutionalizes Ukrainian territorial losses.
The search for peace is fraught with pitfalls. Any temporary solution that preserves, or partially preserves, the battlefield status quo will buy time for Russian forces to regroup after recent heavy losses and prepare for the next onslaught, while leaving Ukraine enfeebled and less than fully sovereign. While a diplomatic solution seems attractive to many in the West, and may suspend hostilities for a period, it would merely postpone an essential reckoning with Russia and is pointless without an achievable long-term plan for Ukraine’s security in place.
Any such plan must set out the conditions for, and pathway towards, a durable peace on Ukraine’s terms. It must enshrine the principle of respect for the country’s sovereign independence and pre-2014 territorial borders. It must also envision future security and political guarantees. The plan’s chances of success will be greater if it supports Ukraine’s aspirations for NATO and EU membership. NATO and other international allies of Ukraine will need to develop this plan jointly with the Ukrainian government, and must remain committed to implementing it.
A stalemate in the war or military setbacks for Ukraine would increase pressure, including potentially from Western allies, for compromise. Calls for ‘pragmatism’ – often a euphemism for granting Russia its demands – are even now proliferating. To counter narratives that might lead in this direction, this report analyses nine commonly articulated fallacies about the approaches the West should adopt – and avoid – in the search for peace. These fallacies broadly fit into two categories: ideas on accommodating Russia’s stated interests to accelerate a peace agreement; and objections to increasing military and other assistance to Ukraine.
Although often well-intentioned, and despite their prominence in policy commentary as serious options for ending the war or avoiding escalation, such ideas are misguided, we argue. Most current suggestions for a settlement would, if implemented, crystallize Russian territorial gains and encourage further aggression in the future. Similarly, restraint in backing Ukraine for fear of provoking Russian reprisals is misplaced. By ignoring the true nature and agenda of Moscow’s regime and the futility of hoping to engage Vladimir Putin in negotiations in good faith, most ‘realist’ arguments for mitigating risk are in fact less realistic than the name suggests.
Backing a full and unambiguous Ukrainian victory is therefore essential not only on moral but also practical grounds. Although recent increases in Western supplies of munitions and other hardware are welcome, the fundamental solution to many of the problems raised in this report remains: that Ukraine still needs a massive influx of weaponry. Without it, Ukraine will cease to exist as a sovereign state and an emboldened Russia will continue its imperialist campaign of expansionism against neighbours and aggression against perceived adversaries, democratic and otherwise, the world over. In the longer term, backing Ukraine will serve to deter other aggressors while potentially sowing the seeds for positive political change in Russia.
Fallacy 1: ‘Settle now: all wars end at the negotiating table’, James Sherr
The war is an existential one for Ukraine, and is also framed by Russia as a war of vital national interests. Similar conflicts have almost always ended with the victory of one belligerent and the defeat of the other. Calls to ‘settle now’ are based on false analogies and an underestimation of the issues at stake.
Fallacy 2: ‘Ukraine should concede territory in exchange for peace’, Simon Smith
Any territorial concessions by Ukraine in a peace agreement with Russia will reward crimes and aggression. They will encourage, not end, Russia’s attacks on countries in its neighbourhood and elsewhere in Europe.
Fallacy 3: ‘Ukraine should adopt neutrality’, Orysia Lutsevych
Calls for Ukraine to become ‘neutral’ because this will remove Russia’s incentive for aggression ignore the fact that Ukraine was already neutral when first attacked in 2014. Implementation of such proposals would expose Ukraine to future attacks that would threaten European security still further.
Fallacy 4: ‘Russian security concerns must be respected’, John Lough
Calls to treat as legitimate the ‘security concerns’ raised by Russia, and to account for these in a future settlement of the war in Ukraine, disregard the fact that Moscow’s requirements are fundamentally incompatible with European security.
Fallacy 5: ‘Russian defeat is more dangerous than Russian victory’, Keir Giles
Fears of inflicting a humiliating defeat on Russia because of immediate retaliation from Moscow or longer-term revanchism are misplaced. Instead, a convincing defeat of Russia is essential both for European security and for change in Russia itself.
Fallacy 6: ‘Russia’s defeat in Ukraine will lead to greater instability in Russia’, Kataryna Wolczuk
Fear of destabilizing Russia or even causing its break-up must not deter the West from pressing for a Ukrainian victory. To do otherwise is to protect Russia and Putin from the consequences of their actions in Ukraine and, if anything, increase Russia’s instability in the longer term.
Fallacy 7: ‘This is costing too much, and the West needs to restore economic ties with Russia’, Timothy Ash
The financial costs of pushing back against Russian aggression in Ukraine are high, but entirely manageable given the size of Western economies. Failure to act would leave Europe at risk of further Russian expansion, attack and economic blackmail, ultimately costing the West much more over the long term.
Fallacy 8: ‘Ukraine’s pursuit of justice hinders peace’, Kateryna Busol
Many believe that for Ukraine to insist on judicial redress is unrealistic and should not be a precondition of a peace settlement. However, quite apart from the moral imperative, the reality is that peace will not hold unless justice – in the form of trials and reparations – is served.
Fallacy 9: ‘This war is not our fight, and there are more important global problems’, Annette Bohr
The West cannot stand aside from Russia’s war on Ukraine. Moscow’s attack on the core interests and values of the transatlantic community has global repercussions, while arguments that fighting Russia reduces scope for climate action or containing China present a false dilemma.
Summary of principles for Western policy on the war
Ukraine must not be pressured, directly or indirectly, into a negotiated pause to the fighting. Instead, Kyiv must be allowed to fight the war to a conclusion before a peace is negotiated. Anything short of this grants Russia success and will encourage future Russian invasions.
Ukraine’s Western backers must recognize that territorial concessions by Ukraine – including over Crimea – are not a workable solution. Granting Russia its wishes will confirm for Moscow that the path of conflict is the right one.
Ukraine must be provided with genuine security guarantees to provide for its future safety. ‘Neutrality’, Ukraine’s status before 2014, provides no such guarantee. This war proves that real safety against Russia lies only within NATO, and with Ukraine’s completed transformation from former Soviet republic to full and free partner within the transatlantic community. Ukrainian membership of NATO and the EU should be a priority.
Ukraine’s Western backers must overcome their fear of inflicting a clear and decisive defeat on Russia. The dangers of this defeat are far outweighed by those of Russian success or an ambiguous end to the conflict.
The potential for political instability within Russia should not be a deterrent to pressing home Ukraine’s advantage. Indeed, the attempted Wagner Group mutiny of 24 June 2023 showed that domestic tumult can offer a tactical edge to Ukraine. The war has shaken the Russian regime, as the rebellion showed, although state fragmentation is unlikely even in the event of Russia’s defeat.
The financing of support for Ukraine must be recognized as an investment in Euro-Atlantic security, and one which is yielding enormous returns in neutralizing the most acute threat to that security. Western governments should make it clearer to their electorates what this investment buys, and if necessary adopt public communications strategies challenging narratives around the fiscal costs of supporting Ukraine. For example, governments should make clear that headline figures on the value of weapons and other equipment supplied to Ukraine mostly do not represent new costs, but materiel already purchased and on hand.
NATO must urgently increase production of munitions and weapons systems, with the aim of matching rates of consumption in Ukraine. This is not only to sustain the Ukrainian armed forces in the current conflict, but also to replenish and augment stockpiles across NATO in readiness for an extended period of military tension, and the possibility of high-intensity warfare. NATO should facilitate international defence procurement collaboration and – in consultation with the EU – remove systemic obstacles such as protectionism impeding multinational defence orders.
The vital requirement for justice for Russia’s war crimes and atrocities must not be disregarded for the sake of a settlement with Moscow. Only accountability will prompt change in Russia. Most pressingly, Ukraine needs ongoing assistance with its vast caseload of war-related proceedings, as well as with the establishment of a special tribunal for Russia’s crime of aggression. Ultimately, support to win the war is necessary to allow a prospect of justice being delivered.
Economic and financial sanctions must be constantly refined and honed to ensure they remain effective. Policy in this area should be informed by an understanding that Russia is involved in a huge effort to get around sanctions. Sanctions remain important in imposing a cost on Russia. They will have an increasing role in constraining the ability of the Russian military-industrial complex to rebuild offensive military capability eroded in Ukraine.
The frozen assets of the Russian state and private individuals must be repurposed to finance reconstruction of Ukraine’s society, infrastructure and economy. Western government funding and private sector investment will not be enough on their own to meet Ukraine’s needs. Asset seizures or some variation on them, quite apart from being the moral choice and a source of substantial additional finance, are also necessary to show Russia and the Russians that crime doesn’t pay. In fact, they should be an essential part of the de-Putinization process that Russia must undergo if it is to join the civilized community of nations.
Finally, it is essential that Western countries – and partners further afield – recognize and accept that the outcome of Russia’s war on Ukraine is a key determinant of their own future safety and security. Any genuine, durable plan for peace can only be implemented after hostilities have ended in Ukraine’s favour. And it must enshrine the principle of respect for the country’s sovereign independence and pre-2014 territorial borders. Any other outcome will set a precedent that encourages aggressors worldwide and degrades the rules-based international order. Ongoing, long-term deterrence of Russia after this war is an essential condition for preserving peace.