Mar 3: Sam Cooper- Chinese interference in Canadian elections
Thread published February 25, 2023
Sam Cooper- PRC interference in Canadian elections
After my eight-month investigation, Global News can reveal new allegations emerging from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service’s ongoing probe into a Chinese Communist Party election-interference scheme.
According to my sources, CSIS started tracking Han Dong, a former Ontario MPP, in summer 2019. They said CSIS believed that Dong emerged suddenly and suspiciously as a successor to MP Geng Tan as the Liberal candidate for Don Valley North.
CSIS investigators would later allege that Chinese Canadian seniors and students were bussed into the riding, and students were told they had to vote for a certain candidate to keep their student visas, sources informed Global News. They said Han Dong was the candidate.
National security officials also allege that Han Dong, now a sitting MP re-elected in 2021, is 1 of at least 11 Toronto-area riding candidates supported by Beijing in 2019. These officials said CSIS also believes Dong is a witting affiliate in China’s election interference.
Dong strongly denies these allegations. "As a Member of Parliament, safeguarding Canada’s democratic institutions is a fundamental part of my job, and I take all serious allegations of foreign interference very seriously,” Dong said.
“I am unaware of the claims provided to you by alleged sources, which contains seriously inaccurate information," Dong said, in answer to my questions in this investigation.
We broke this story on Global National tonight and I will be digging into the implications on Sunday with @MercedesGlobal and former CSIS director Dick Fadden
On our broadcast tonight I explained how CSIS believes former Ontario Liberal Trade Minister Michael Chan promoted Han Dong to take the riding nomination, and Michael Chan is a top target in ongoing CSIS investigations, according to sources with knowledge.
In the alleged briefing, the Service did not provide details of their ongoing investigations into Michael Chan and Han Dong, but outlined two major allegations to support their recommendation, sources aware of the intelligence said.
“CSIS was concerned that Han Dong was connected to People’s Republic of China foreign interference in Canada,” an official with knowledge of the brief told Global News. “And that Han Dong also was a close contact of Michael Chan, who was a target of CSIS.”
But rather than heeding the alleged CSIS concerns about Dong, the party allowed him to proceed in 2019, and he won the seat.
Furthermore, two sources alleged, 2 weeks after the briefing, a Liberal Party staffer responsible for overseeing 25 GTA ridings, allegedly informed Dong’s team that the candidate was a CSIS target.
“This was a classified briefing of serious and extremely sensitive nature to Liberal Party of Canada senior staff who hold security clearances,” an intelligence official told me, in my investigation for Global News.
Now some background on my investigation. Since last summer I have known that Michael Chan is a top target in the Service's high-profile, sensitive investigation into alleged CCP United Front Work Department election interference in Canada, according to intelligence sources.
Mr. Chan vehemently denies all allegations that he is an agent of Beijing involved in federal election interference. I learned though, CSIS has been watching Mr. Chan for over a decade, even taking interest in his expansive mansion in Markham, sources said.
In October '22, before the York municipal election, I looked at Chan's property, and saw his election signage. He is now deputy mayor in Markham.
This is it. When I took a look in October 2022, Mr. Chan was running for York Region council. He is now deputy mayor.
Through sources and documents, which will be quoted in the following thread, I learned CSIS believes Michael Chan is allegedly an agent of Beijing who has secretly provided political information to the Toronto Consulate.
Chan denies the allegations.
“This sort of vague innuendo is impossible to respond to,” he said in an emailed response. “To the extent you are suggesting I am not a true Canadian, you should be ashamed of yourself.”
Intelligence sources spoke to Global News for this story on the condition of anonymity, which they requested because they risk prosecution under the Security of Information Act.
The circumstances under which Han Dong replaced incumbent Liberal MP Geng Tan as candidate for Don Valley North, was a focus of the Service's 2019 federal election investigation, and the core of the suspected interference from Beijing, our sources said.
CSIS allegedly had intelligence that Beijing preferred Han Dong to Tan. “The Consulate was not pleased with Geng Tan’s performance,” a national security official aware of the service’s investigation told Global News.
So what happened once Dong was vying for nominee in Don Valley North, with Geng Tan out of the picture?
According to a case cited in an October 2022 CSIS report, there can be systemic problems underlying: “Nomination Processes.”
"Individuals who are not Canadian citizens, and therefore cannot vote in elections at any level of government in Canada — can still vote in a party nomination process as long as they are party members,” the CSIS record says.
It adds “gaining a party’s nomination in a riding that has long supported that party is akin to winning the subsequent election,” and state actors “exploit this loophole to engage in Foreign Interference that target specific candidates in particular electoral ridings.”
While it does not identify Dong or his riding, the report describes the service’s Don Valley North investigation findings, an intelligence official said.
“CSIS reporting indicates that, during a political party nomination vote prior to the 2019 General Election in Canada, two busloads of Chinese Canadian seniors were brought in to support a specific candidate,” the report says.
It adds that the seniors had the name of the candidate they were told to vote for concealed under their sleeves.
“Chinese international students were also transported in to support the same candidate,” the report says. “The students were given letters that provided them with an address in the specific riding, thereby enabling them to participate in the nomination vote."
It adds "The students were also ‘told by the PRC Consulate’ to support the specific candidate, ‘if they want(ed) to maintain their student visa status.’ CSIS intelligence indicates that this candidate is very close to — and receives support from — the PRC Consulate.”
In response to these details, the Liberal Party of Canada said that Dong was nominated by registered Liberals in an open nomination process that complied with its national nomination rules.
In my investigation I reviewed sensitive documents. Again, sources have such concern for the future of Canadian elections and what they see as lack of response in the Trudeau govt to growing threats, that I was provided understanding + viz on docs.
Sources said some of the service’s more pointed concerns about Chan and Dong’s actions in the Ontario legislature are documented in a July 2018 CSIS record, “Foreign Influenced Activities in Canada: Critical Threats to Canadian Democracy.”
“A provincial Cabinet Minister responsible for the province’s ‘dealings with PRC officials appeared to favour China’s interests in many of his activities,'” a document referring to the 2018 CSIS record says.
“This individual provided political information to the PRC Consulate and offered to verbally attack other members of the provincial assembly who raised Chinese human rights issues.”
It adds: “PRC Consulate officials and two members of a provincial legislature persuaded a MP at a specific community event to decline an invitation to travel to Taiwan. The PRC Ambassador was kept apprised throughout the event on the progress of their efforts.”
Three intelligence sources said Michael Chan and Han Dong were the unidentified Ontario Liberal MPPs cited in this record, who allegedly pressured Liberal MP Geng Tan to forgo the Taiwan trip.
