Today we can say with certainty that the success of the Russian winter offensive was extremely limited. In the area around Bakhmut, they advanced on a 10-15 kilometer-wide area. That is all the success they achieved.
Elsewhere, the frontline remained either completely unchanged -- at Kupyansk and Kreminna in the northern direction and at Vuhledar to the south. Or they advanced by a few kilometers: for example, at Avdiivka, at Marjinka. This is a very meager advance compared to the losses the Russian army suffered. Ukrainian losses are probably also considerable, but many times smaller.
At the moment, we waiting for the start of the Ukrainian offensive. The events of the last week indicate that this time is near. Systematic attacks on Russian fuel depots is a clear sign that an offensive is being planned. Russian logistics are difficult when there is no fuel and they will have to bring it from farther afield.
Ukraine has 15-20 brigades, which have had over half a year of proper training in war conditions. This is a considerable number, which can certainly achieve a breakthrough on certain fronts. If they break through the defenses, the Russian front may collapse as it did in Kharkiv last autumn.
A major Ukrainian ground assault should be preceded by strikes against Russian airfields. The goal would be to get the Russian air force down so they would have to start coming from farther away than the airfields near the front. This would be a clear sign that the time for a ground assault is drawing near. This is in addition to destroying fuel depots and railways. Destruction of the railways will give a momentary result. They can be repaired in 1-2 days. But at some point they will be very important when Russia needs to urgently transport more units to a specific location.
Whether this will happen in a month or a few weeks is anyone's guess. When a serious maneuver starts, we will know about it. I think there will be disguised attempts. They will start attacking from direction X, to see if Russian bring in additional units. If they don't, Ukraine will press on from there, although that may not have been the main direction originally. They will seize the opportunity.
If you look at the map, Russia will have to take a longer route to bring in units than the Ukrainians will have to travel. This gives Ukraine a couple of days' advantage once the maneuvering gets going.
What is the expectation of the Ukrainian offensive operation? The liberation of territory. The biggest prize would be winning back southern Ukraine, Melitopol. And severing the land link with Crimea.
Luhansk and Kharkiv in the north are an option for Ukraine. I can't rule out Ukraine trying to fortify the Dnipro River, but I don't think that is very likely. Success could also be achieved in Donetsk. While Melitopol is still 60-70 km away from the frontline, the centre of Donetsk is barely 20 km away in some places. Obviously Russian defenses are also much stronger there. The front has been more or less in place since 2014 there. As a surprise option, the Ukrainians are considering it.
Political context: I believe the Western allies' support will certainly hold at least as long as there is hope that the summer offensive will bring military success and Ukraine will be able to liberate territory.
The only person showing signs that make me worried is Macron with his visit to China and his grossly unsuccessful message that Taiwan is not a European problem. Also his talk about the strategic autonomy of Europe, which was a poorly chosen criticism of the U.S. China is not the the right place to do this, if you're going to do it at all. Macron clearly wanted to please the Chinese. Domestically he is a lame duck after the pension reform which means he will probably make similar unpredictable statements during the next four years.
Russian attempts to get more support from China have not had much effect. Politically, China is more likely to support the Russians, but arms and technology assistance have come in very limited quantities. There has been no arms in any serious form.
In the context of the Russian politics, nothing has changed. So far the domestic situation is under the control of the Russian political elite. There is no sign of major shifts in society. It's a brainwashed and imperialist society, where at least until the next major defeat, people are behind the political power.
I am surprised that Russia has not had another larger mobilization wave. This indicates that Putin actually is not so sure how strong a control he has over the society. The Russian Presidential Administration has for decades commissioned very thorough polls that are never made public. They are able to gauge the temperature of the society very accurately. Perhaps this (no new mobilization) shows something that we don't know publicly, why he hasn't taken the mobilization risk.
The only period when Putin's public support dropped was September-October, when there was the first round of mobilization. But maybe Putin also doesn't have the full picture of how difficult the situation for Russians really is. Perhaps he is hoping for an immediate breakthrough in Bakhmut and that then the Ukrainian defenses on the eastern front will collapse.
I wouldn't pay too much attention to Prigozhin's video. No independent unit of Prigozhin can fight without being supplied with weapons and officers by Russian army. These units are still under general command, not operating separately. His statements may indicate moderate fighting within the elite, but nothing more. Wagner is simply a different method of recruiting than a conventional army. I think there is a lot of noise on this topic and it has no bearing on the war progress.
On the drone strike at the Kremlin: "I'm 99% sure it wasn't the Ukrainians. It may have been organised by Russia itself to mobilize society. Or it could have been representatives of the security structures outside the control of the Russian authorities. Usually information about such explosions reaches the Russian media and social media within minutes or hours. This time it took more than 12 hours. Yes, it was on some minor Telegram channel in an hour and a half, but that does not count. Peskov a day later says the Americans organized it. This suggests an attempt to mobilize society -- that we are facing a formidable opponent lke the Americans. Again, given the overall dynamics of the war, this event is totally insignificant. It plays no role whatsoever in the grand scheme of things. The claim that there was a desire to kill Putin is absurd. He does not spend the night there, he rarely goes there at all.
Zelenskyy rejected Ukrainian involvement outright. Usually the Ukrainians fudge it: somebody was smoking, etc. Their tactic is not to reject, not to embrace. This time Zelensky clearly rejected it.
On Russia's military situation... The offensive capability is exhausted. How strong is the defensive capability, we will see when the Ukrainian attack starts. It is easier to defend. According to one version, the Russian military leadership is trying to make it clear that it is time to defend and hold the territory that has been won. This has no effect on Putin. His aim is still to reach the borders of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, but there are tens of kilometers to go over a wide area.
May 9: Michael Weiss, From my friend "Karl"