Nov 10- Communicating about Ukraine
Threads by Dante Atkins and Anders Aslund, article by Anders Umland
Day 260: Communicating about Ukraine
Since I’m travelling, EuroFile will be published in a reduced format. It’ll be business as usual by Saturday.
Dante Atkins on Communicating about Ukraine (Oct 25, 2022)
Here are some things you might think it's perfectly fine and noble to do in your communications about the war in Ukraine, and here's why you shouldn't do them.
A few off the top of my head.
You should not say "we need diplomacy to avoid nuclear war." Why? Because Putin is the only one making nuclear threats, and he's doing it to to scare you into accepting concessions to Ukrainian sovereignty and providing legitimacy for his conquests.
You should not call for a "negotiated settlement." Why? Because when you do, you are strongly implying that Ukraine's territorial integrity should be on the table. If you don't believe it should be, then there's nothing to negotiate.
You should not call for a "ceasefire" as long as Russia is still illegally annexing and occupying Ukrainian land. As long as that is the case, a ceasefire benefits Russia and disadvantages Ukraine, with no promise of any productive negotiations.
You should not compare Putin's invasion of Ukraine to the Cuban Missile Crisis. The CMC was bilateral brinksmanship over intermediate-range nuclear posture. Making that comparison implies that both sides are at fault and have something to give, which is not the case.
You should not use the term "forever war" to describe US support for Ukraine. That puts our support for Ukraine in the same category as our counterproductive and wrongheaded occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan. There is simply no comparison between the two, so don't.
That's pretty much it. This thread is designed for the well-intentioned. I can't get into refuting MAGA or tankie stuff here because there's too much of it.
Andreas Umland, Russia's Pseudo-Intellectuals- American Purpose
A particularly dark aspect of Russia's war of annihilation against Ukraine and its political warfare against the West is its broad support among not only ordinary Russians but also the country's elites.
The normative drift of parts of the Russian educated class away from Europe has a variety of reasons. While for many professional academics, utilitarian considerations or simple fear of the government may be salient—as was probably the case for some of the more than 700 Russian university rectors who collectively approved Moscow’s “special operation” in Ukraine in a March 2022 statement—many also support their country’s aggression from the bottom of their hearts.
Nor are these individuals afraid to make their position known repeatedly and unequivocally, as illustrated in the New York Times interview with the once respected Dean of the Faculty of World Economy and International Relations at the Moscow School of Economics (HSE), Sergei Karaganov. It’s tellingly titled "Why Russia Believes It Cannot Lose the War in Ukraine."
Anders Aslund- Countering Russian Disinformation (Oct 30, 2022)
Recently, I was asked why the West is so ineffective in countering Russian disinformation in Russia. The answer is that the Western media outreach remains in the Cold War in technology, programming and financing. Everything must be done differently. My ideas:
1. Currently, two excellent channels remain to the Russian public: YouTube and Telegram channels. They are so widely used for so many purposes that the authorities are not likely to be able to close them down. Western information must use them more efficiently.
2. To attract big audiences, you need to have attractive media personalities. Almost all top Russian media personalities have fled to the West. Only in Riga, about 250 Russian journalists have arrived. The outstanding leaders among them should be given solid Western financing.
3. Not only the best Russian journalists but also their companies have emigrated to the West: TV Rain, Gusinsky's TV, Meduza, Navalny, Novaya Gazeta Europa, New Times. Their journalists are concentrated in Riga but spread to Tbilisi, Vilnius, Tallinn, Amsterdam, London and New York.
4. The best way of reaching out to the Russian public would be to give these and other independent Russian media abroad sudden and big financing so that they can reach out far more to Russians through Telegram channels and YouTube.
The sources can be many. Do something!